Abstract: For each two-player game, a linear-programming algorithm finds a component of the Nash equilibria and a subset of its perfect equilibria that are simply stable: there are nearby equilibria for each nearby game that perturbs one strategy's probability or payoff more than others.
Introduction
A subset of a game's equilibria is stable only if each nearby game has equilibria near this subset. Kohlberg and Mertens' (1986) definition actually reserves 'stable' for a minimal closed subset with this property. Moreover, to reduce the size of stable sets, they restrict the neighborhood of nearby games to only those payoff perturbations induced by perturbing the lower bounds on players' mixed strategies. They show that stable sets exist and at least one lies within a single component. They also verify other desirable properties:
Invariance: a stable set depends only on the minimal nonredundant description of the game, called the reduced normal form.
Admissibility: no equilibrium in a minimal stable set uses a weakly-dominated strategy.
Forward Induction: a stable set contains a stable set of the game obtained by deleting a strategy that is weakly dominated or strictly inferior at all equilibria in the set.
Unfortunately, their definition allows a stable set to span multiple components. Identifying a stable set within a single component is desirable in any case because all equilibria in the same component of a generic extensive game have the same equilibrium path and therefore the same outcomes; i.e., these equilibria differ only off the unique equilibrium path. For a generic game, therefore, a single-component stable set's equilibrium path and its outcome are 'stable' too. Uniqueness of this sort is essential for empirical studies -though more than one component can be stable. Mertens (1989 Mertens ( , 1991 adopts a revised definition that enforces connectedness and, partly as a result, gets the further property of Backward Induction: each stable set contains a proper (and therefore perfect) equilibrium. His definition is couched in terms of homology theory so we do not repeat it here; but for two-player games a necessary (and nearly sufficient) condition that a component is stable is again that each perturbed game has equilibria nearby. 4 4 For the two-player games addressed here, all computations are linear, which allows bypassing some aspects of Mertens' definition; also, for simplicity we apply the definition to stable components, not smaller connected sets. With these provisos, Mertens' definition says essentially that a component is stable if the projection from a neighborhood of the component to a neighborhood of the game is homologically nontrivial. For expository purposes, Parts I and II develop the algorithm in two stages. The first stage (x2 and x5) reviews the setup and the Lemke-Howson (LH) algorithm for finding an equilibrium of a generic two-player normal-form game. It also describes the amendments that enable the algorithm to find perfect equilibria of nongeneric normal-form games: this is important because nontrivial extensive games, even generic ones, have nongeneric normal forms. Some examples in x3 motivate the subsequent presentation. The second stage (x4 and x6) shows how the LH algorithm can be applied repeatedly to find a component and a subset of its vertices that are simply stable.
The gist is the following. Like the LH algorithm, ours follows paths on which at most one pure strategy is used (i.e., with positive probability) without being optimal, and another's probability or payoff is perturbed. Geometrically, each path is a onedimensional locus connecting vertices of best-reply regions along adjacent edges. It begins at a specified starting point and terminates at a vertex of some component. Each path is generated by the plausible rule of parametrically increasing the probability of a newly optimal strategy, or decreasing the profitability of a newly unused strategy, until an equilibrium is reached; cf. Wilson (1972) . This rule is implemented by numerical operations on a tableau of detached coefficients as in linear programming.
To this we add a step applied when the LH algorithm terminates at a vertex that is not a strict equilibrium, and therefore not stable as a singleton set. A new perturbation is invoked to transit onto an alternative path, enabling continuation to another vertex. If a path starts to exit prematurely from a component then this step is applied in reverse to move to a vertex that terminates a path with a previous perturbation; these reversals enable the algorithm to follow folds in the graph of equilibria.
The perturbations that guide the paths reflect the motivation for stability as a refinement; viz., to be stable an equilibrium outcome must be affected slightly by small probabilities of deviant behaviors. Although the algorithm generally allows any generic perturbations as guides, for simple stability we use only 2n different guides, each lying shows that this definition implies the necessity of the condition stated in the text; i.e., the projection is onto, so no region is left uncovered. This setup allows a large family of definitions depending on the homology theory used and the normalizations allowed, but he shows that these definitions are essentially equivalent. Mertens (1987) shows that applying a minimality requirement would violate the desirable property that the solution depends only on the ordinal properties of players' preferences. 4 in a different corner of a simplex of n probability and n payoff perturbations generating a neighborhood of the original game. In particular, each corner perturbation has an equilibrium near the component's vertex that is the terminus of the path guided by this perturbation -one says that this vertex 'covers' the perturbation. Coincidentally, using these perturbations assures that the algorithm generates only perfect equilibria.
The sequence of paths is called a route. From a specified starting point, a route follows a path to a vertex in some component. A route's subsequent paths within each component proceed around a 'great circle' of its vertices and their connecting edges. 5 The route exits onto another path to a new component if the sequence of covered perturbations doubles back on itself: this event reveals that the graph of equilibria has a fold that (presumably, but not surely) leaves some perturbations uncovered. In any case, each route surely terminates with vertices forming a simply-stable set. The signal for termination is that all corners are covered by the vertices encountered in the current component. Although this stopping rule assures finite termination, the vertices need not be a stable set because coverage of only the 2n corners (and incidentally 2n 0 1 edges traversed enroute) is verified; e.g., interior perturbations are not checked explicitly. One could use additional guides (such as perturbations of mixed strategies) to verify stronger variants of simple stability, but we do not pursue that task here.
Part I: Construction of Stable Sets

Review of the Lemke-Howson Algorithm
As mentioned, our algorithm uses the LH algorithm repeatedly as a 'subroutine'. Its operation can be explained in geometric terms by considering the following example, which represents a generic normal-form game.
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Suppose a player has three pure strategies. Then the mixed strategies can be represented as points in a triangular simplex, as in Figure 1 . The three extreme points identify 5 The algorithm is designed purposely not to examine all vertices, since their number can be enormous. The situation is like the difference between the lengths of a circular orbit around the earth, and a flight over every city. 6 The terms 'generic normal-form' in game-theoretic lingo and 'nondegenerate' in linear-programming lingo are essentially equivalent. 5 the pure strategies and a point in a face or the interior identifies the corresponding mixture of pure strategies of which it is a convex combination. Each vertex is marked by a circled letter that is the name of the pure strategy. The face opposite the vertex is labeled by the same letter to indicate that all the points on the face are mixed strategies not using that strategy; i.e., its probability is zero there.
The example shown in Figure 2 displays two simplices, one for player 1 with pure strategies a, b, and c, and one for player 2 with pure strategies d, e, and f . Further, the interior of each simplex is divided into regions: each region is labeled by the name of the pure strategy of the other player that is his best reply to any mixed strategy in the region. On the boundary between two or more best-reply regions, the best replies include all the best replies in adjacent regions: consequently, imagine that each edge or point bears the labels of its adjacent best-reply regions, as well as the labels of any pure strategies unused there.
For practical purposes this is a complete description of the game. To see this, recall that an equilibrium is a pair of strategies, one for each player, such that each pure strategy is used only if it is a best reply to the other's strategy. This is the same as saying that an equilibrium is a pair of points, one in each simplex, that is completely labeled: between them they bear all labels a; . . . ; f . For, if the point in a pure strategy's own simplex does not have its label then it is used, so it must be a best reply to the other's strategy, and therefore the point in the other simplex must bear its label. Figure 2 by the two endpoints of the dashed curve between the tops of the two simplices, the LH algorithm starts by assigning one player, say player 1, a strategy that is pure, say a, and the other, player 2, the strategy d that is a best reply to a.
As indicated in
Thus, we start at a pair of pure strategies missing only label a -meaning that only a is used without being a best reply. The algorithm then follows the locus of points missing only label a, until it terminates at a pair with all labels, which is therefore an equilibrium.
This path consists of the following edges in Figure 2 . We move first along edge 1: b is an unused best reply at 2's pure strategy d so we can increase the probability of using b and still be missing only label a, but we must stop at the next vertex because going further would lose label d. But now f is a best reply so in 2's simplex we next traverse edge 2 until continuing would lose label b, and c becomes a best reply. Continuing thus, 7 we follow edge 3 and then edge 4, whereupon a becomes a best reply and a completely labeled pair is obtained, as indicated by the two endpoints of the lower dashed curve.
A locus of this kind, and each point on it, is said to be almost-completely labeled; in this case, only label a is missing until the terminus is reached.
This procedure is entirely general. Start from a pair of pure strategies that is almostcompletely labeled, missing at most one label (say a). If this pair is not completely labeled then following the incident locus of almost-completely labeled pairs finds a completely labeled pair that is an equilibrium. The algorithm cannot cycle because at most one pair of pure strategies is missing label a, and at the end of each edge one label becomes newly duplicated, identifying a unique edge in the other simplex along which the locus continues -or label a is obtained and an equilibrium is reached.
The path can be construed as a 'homotopy', as we now describe. We start with an artificial game that is easy to solve, namely player 1 receives a large bonus for using strategy a, in which case the pair (a; d) of pure strategies is indeed an equilibrium.
Tracing the equilibria as the bonus is reduced to zero (i.e., player 1 is weaned from subsidy) amounts to following the locus of almost-completely labeled pairs until we arrive at an equilibrium of the true game. This interpretation reveals, however, that the graph of the locus may have folds, as shown for a hypothetical example in Figure 3 for the case that a is a best reply at the terminus (alternatively the terminus can occur where a's probability drops to zero while the bonus is still positive). The fact that the graph has only folds (if any) and no gaps, holes, or knots, is a general result established by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986, Theorem 1) .
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The LH algorithm allows a significant generalization. If we start at any other equilibrium then again we can move along the locus of pairs missing only label a (viz., the initial segment moves away from whichever region bears label a at the equilibrium) to reach another equilibrium. Thus the number of equilibria is odd: the equilibria are connected 7 Their theorem states that the projection from the graph of the equilibrium correspondence to the space of games is homotopic to a homeomorphism. This means that the graph can be stretched to eliminate folds without leaving holes. They use essentially the space of bonuses to model the space of games, so the graph in Figure 3 illustrates their result along a slice in which only the bonus for strategy a varies. They actually model these spaces as spheres by adding a point at infinity: in Part II we proceed similarly by including an 'extraneous vertex'. in pairs via paths missing only label a, except for the unique equilibrium connected by such a path to the unique pair of pure strategies missing at most label a. This can be seen in Figure 3 : for each bonus specifying a generic game the number of equilibria is finite and odd.
Next we describe how the LH algorithm can be amended to handle nongeneric games. In geometric terms, a game is nongeneric if an end of an edge provides multiple choices for continuation; that is, one label is lost but two or more are acquired. This kind of degeneracy can happen along a face where a strategy of 1 is unused if one of 2's best replies is optimal only when 2 is certain that 1 will not use this strategy. A more complicated instance typical of extensive games is shown in the left panel of Figure 4 , where 2 is indifferent between d and e if 1 uses only a. The middle panel shows that this case can be handled by perturbing the probability of choosing b; i.e., this strategy is forced to be used with at least a small positive probability, which moves inward the face labeled b. This is called a primal perturbation. An alternative technique uses a dual perturbation that gives 2 a small bonus for choosing e, as shown in the right panel.
In either case, the net effect is to assure that 2 has a unique best reply. In numerical computations it is unnecessary to invoke perturbations of either kind: Part II describes a unified lexicographic scheme that has the same effect.
Lastly we describe how, when the LH algorithm has reached a completely labeled pair using one perturbation, this perturbation can be replaced by another to begin a new path. We use primal perturbations to depict how this is done; dual perturbations are analogous. The left panel of Figure 5 shows a vertex of 1's mixed strategies that is part of an equilibrium in which strategies b and c are unused, d is a used best-reply of 2, and e is an unused best reply. This equilibrium is consistent with the primal perturbation in which b is perturbed more than it is used (slightly) but not optimal. Now e is an unused best reply, so the path continues by following the edge in the other player's simplex that makes e a used strategy.
In sum: Paths of the LH algorithm depend on the missing label and the perturbation or lexicographic scheme that resolves degeneracies. Each path's starting and ending points are completely labeled (and therefore equilibria), except one can be the unique pair of almost-completely labeled pure strategies. At an equilibrium where an optimal strategy is unused, one can transit onto a new path to another equilibrium by revising the perturbation.
After these preliminaries, in the next section we introduce the notion of stability via examples that illustrate the main ideas. The Game "Do The Right Thing" 
Examples of Stable Sets
The main example is the extensive game 'Do The Right Thing' shown in Figure 6 . In this game, player 1 moves first, choosing either strategy a yielding payoffs (3; 6) to players 1 and 2, or giving the next move to 2, who chooses either strategy d yielding payoffs This game illustrates the main ideas: the first component is not stable and the way it fails is indicative of the general case, whereas the second component is stable. We use the four panels in Figure 8 to describe the test for stability: the two upper panels refer to the first component, and the left and right panels pertain to primal and dual perturbations. Initially we refer only to the left panels, and then repeat the analysis in a dual form using the right panels.
Primal Stability
Although similar to the left panel of Figure 7 , the upper-left panel of Figure 8 depicts the nonnegative perturbations ( a ; b ; c ) of the probabilities of 1's pure strategies a, b, and c. These are normalized so they sum to a small constant; thus, the simplex represents a cross-section of the cone of nonnegative perturbations analogous to Figure 1 . The side labeled a is where a = 0, indicating that 1's pure strategy a has only the natural lower bound 0 on the probability that it is used. Recall that the first component has 1 using a and 2 adopting any mixed strategy for which a is a best reply. One vertex of this component has 2 using e (in Figure 7 this is the vertex labeled AB, as explained later): this pair obviously remains an equilibrium if the minimum probability e of using e is increased slightly, since e is already used with probability 1. This property is also true 'approximately' for perturbations d and f of 2's strategies d and f , in the sense that these perturbations move the vertex slightly and do not alter 1's best reply a. 
Dual Stability
Dual stability is motivated by the observation that the effect on an equilibrium of perturbing one player's strategies can be mimicked by appropriate bonuses for the other player: each strategy gets a bonus that offsets the risk represented by the other's perturbation.
The upper-right panel depicts the simplex of 2's nonnegative bonuses d ; e ; f , normalized to sum to a small constant; similarly, the lower-right panel depicts 1's bonuses.
Note that an equal bonus for each of 2's strategies ( d = e = f ) leaves that player's best replies unchanged: the barycenter of the dual-perturbation simplex represents a strategically equivalent game so it is in every covered region.
For the first component, the right panel of Figure 7 labels each vertex by labels from the regions shown in the upper-right panel of Figure 8 . These indicate the bonuses covered by that equilibrium; e.g., for any bonus in region B there is an equilibrium near each of two vertices bearing label B. This component is not dual stable because the shaded region is not covered; i.e., dual perturbations in this region have no equilibria near the first component. One can verify this in Figure 9 , which redraws the left panel of Figure 7 after the game is perturbed by a bonus for d that is larger than the bonuses for e and f : for this dual perturbation there is no completely-labeled pair of points for which a is a best reply for player 2. As shown in Figure 8 's lower-right panel, the second component is stable because all bonuses are covered by equilibria E and F.
Folds in the Equilibrium Graph
It is useful to visualize the graph of the equilibrium correspondence in the two upper According to Kohlberg and Mertens (1986, Theorem 1) and Mertens (1989 Mertens ( , 1991 , this situation is typical. A component is unstable if over a neighborhood of perturbations its graph folds over so as to leave uncovered some residual region of perturbations. Each generic perturbation is covered an even number of times, including some covered zero times. 8 A stable component can cover generic perturbations an even number of times constructs a three-player example) but at least one must produce odd It is important to realize, however, that folds occur frequently in components that are stable, so the mere existence of a fold does not imply a component is unstable. Figure 11 shows an example of the 'Caterpillar Game' and the covered regions of dual perturbations of 2's strategies e, f , and h for the single component where 1 uses only a. Equilibria in a cycle around the component cover the regions AD, B, CD, D, and again AD. Thus, there is a fold from CD to D that reverses to cover AD, and thereby D is covered three times.
Construction of Simply-Stable Sets
We now describe an adaptation of the LH algorithm to compute a simply-stable set of vertices in a single component. Recall that such a set must be near an equilibrium of each game obtained by perturbing some strategy. Each strategy has two possible perturbations: the primal constrains the strategy's probability to be slightly positive and the dual awards a small bonus for choosing the strategy. If a set satisfies the weaker criterion that invokes only primal or only dual perturbations then it is called primal or dual simply stable. To describe the algorithm geometrically we use the dual version that finds a dual simply-stable set. Again, we illustrate with the game 'Do the Right Thing'
in Figures 6-8.
Because stability is a relevant consideration only for games that are nongeneric in the normal form (even if they are generic in the extensive form), we implement the LH algorithm in the form adapted to handle degeneracy, as described in x2. To construct a dual simply-stable set, we guide the algorithm with perturbations from the simplex of bonuses depicted in the upper-right panel of Figure 8 . Although the choice is fairly arbitrary, we use a generic perturbation close to some corner; as mentioned, this is made precise in Part II by using perturbations derived from a lexicographic order. If the guide is in the shaded region then the algorithm never enters the first component, since it has no equilibrium covering a perturbation in this corner. Suppose, however, that the initial guide is a perturbation in region B and that the LH algorithm arrives at the vertex labeled AB in Figure 7 -which it does if the missing label is e or f. Our task is to verify whether this component is dual simply stable, and if not to move on to another component.
Suppose that our intention is to find vertices covering the corners in counterclockwise order. We have covered the corner where only e is positive and we want next to cover the corner where only f is positive. To do this we alter the guide to one near that corner (i.e., in the region D) and resume the LH algorithm to arrive at the equilibrium labeled CD by traversing the path labeled 1 in Figure 7 . This path can be viewed alternatively via its projection onto a path in the simplex of perturbations, connecting the first corner to the second. Having completed this step successfully, we next adopt a guide near the corner where only d is positive (i.e., in the shaded region). Again resuming the LH algorithm, the resulting path traverses the edge labeled 2 to the vertex C, then the edge labeled 3 to the vertex BD, and then (!) it starts to leave the component by exiting along the edge labeled 4. This path can be seen fully in Figure 9 , which shows the effect of the bonus d for 2's strategy d on the best-reply regions in 1's simplex of mixed strategies:
the path missing label f follows the sequence 2 ! 2 3 ! 3 ! 3 3 ! 4 of edges from the vertex CD in the first component to the vertex E in the second. In this example, in fact, the algorithm is allowed to exit from BD: it continues on to reach the second component's equilibrium E, and there a repetition of the procedure verifies that the second component is dual simply stable.
In general, however, one does not always let the LH algorithm exit a component, and we now describe why and the procedural rule that applies. In the above example, the LH algorithm is allowed to exit because we have arrived at an equilibrium BD that covers again the region B from which we started; indicating that region B and in particular the corner perturbation used as the initial guide are covered twice. The equilibrium correspondence folds over without covering the corner where only d is positive; thus, moving on to another component is a plausible tactic. Along the sequence of paths to reach such a conclusion, however, we must contend with the fact that there may be many folds, and some may be temporary ones that ultimately reverse. Thus, at intermediate steps we follow the sequence of folds until eventually either we exit at another vertex covering the initial corner (as in the example), or the folds reverse and we can proceed forward again. In general, except at a vertex covering the initial guide, whenever the LH algorithm would exit the component we revert back to the previous guide, which the current folded piece of the graph covers. From there we may need to revert further, eventually exiting if the initial guide recurs, or we may be able to continue forward again.
This reversion process is sketched in Figure 12 , which depicts schematically a typical corresponding edge. This reversion backwards continues until either one arrives back at the initial guide (indicating that exit is OK because the graph is folded over completely) or eventually one reaches an edge on which the fold reverses (as indicated schematically by the dashed segment).
Summary
To find a simply-stable set, the algorithm starts with an initial guide that is a generic perturbation near one corner of the simplex of primal and dual perturbations. From an almost completely-labeled pair of pure strategies it uses the LH algorithm to follow The entire route traces a unique one-dimensional locus that cannot branch or cycle:
after a finite number of steps it terminates with a simply-stable set of vertices in a single component. This conclusion is derived in two parts. The first is based on (1) the previous observation that each path between or within components cannot branch or cycle, and (2) the further fact that at each vertex the rules allow precisely two incident paths: the route enters on one and exits on the other.
Part II: Algebraic Specification of the Algorithm
The geometric sketch of the algorithm leaves aspects uncovered, so we present an algebraic construction that is more precise. x5 specifies the formulation and reviews the LH algorithm as amended for nongeneric games, which require lexicographic procedures to cope with degeneracy. Details of the numerical procedures are relegated to the Appendix. x6 describes the algorithm for calculating a simply-stable set and proves that it works.
Formulation
The game in normal form is described by two m 1 by m 2 matrices U 1 and U Except for the extraneous solution h x;yi = h 0; 1i, each solution of this problem yields an equilibrium by normalizing each player's elements of x to sum to 1. We sometimes refer to a solution as an equilibrium (possibly extraneous).
The set of feasible solutions to the linear system is a compact convex polyhedron whose vertices are basic solutions. Each basis consists of n columns from the n 2 2n matrix A [U; I ] such that the basis matrix B comprising these columns is nonsingular 9 We use 1 to indicate a vector of ones, 0 to indicate a vector or matrix of zeros, and a prime to indicate 'transpose'.
10 This form is used here for expositional purposes. For computations it is more efficient to treat the players' problems separately so that one works with two m 1 2 m 2 matrices. In fact, it is sufficient to carry out basis changes via pivoting on the two m2 m submatrices representing the m rows and columns of the players' used strategies. In large games, m is typically small compared to m 1 and m 2 . The Lemke-Howson Algorithm Lemke and Howson (1964) show that if the problem is nondegenerate then, fixing some strategy i, each complementary vertex is connected to another by a locus called an i-path that consists of a sequence of adjacent i-ac vertices and their connecting edges. 11 The locus of an i-path is defined by relaxing the complementarity condition to allow x i y i 0;
thus, i-ac vertices occur as intermediate points.
Complementary vertices are connected in pairs by i-paths, and no two pairs overlap, so their number is even. Excluding the 11 See also Lemke (1965) and Tomlin (1978) . Nondegeneracy requires that basic variables always have positive values (b 0), which is satisfied by generic normal-form games but not by nontrivial generic extensive games. An extension to degenerate twoplayer games is by Eaves (1971) . For other cases the extensions assume nondegeneracy: two-player games of incomplete information by Howson and Rosenthal (1974) ; Nplayer polymatrix games by Eaves (1973) and Howson (1972) ; general N -player games, by Rosenmüller (1971) and Wilson (1971) ; and Walrasian equilibria of piecewise-linear economies, by Wilson (1978) . The latter three require nonlinear (actually, multilinear) calculations; for games with three or more players it is therefore often more efficient to use approximation methods based on simplicial subdivisions. extraneous vertex, these yield all the equilibria (an odd number) due to nondegeneracy.
To find an equilibrium, the algorithm can start from the extraneous vertex and follow some i-path to find the complementary vertex that is its other terminus.
The procedural steps of the LH algorithm are as follows. Given any complementary vertex as a starting point, the unique incident i-path is traversed by initially increasing (i.e., making basic) the one of x i or y i that is initially nonbasic. One arrives thereby at an initial i-ac vertex with some complementary pair fx j ; y j g, j 6 = i, having both members nonbasic, one of which most recently became nonbasic and the other was previously nonbasic: this is the current 'nonbasic duplicated pair'. (For instance, starting from the extraneous vertex, the initial i-ac vertex is the pair of i-ac pure strategies, as in Figure 2 for the case that i = a and the nonbasic duplicated pair has j = b.) Thereafter the steps are mandatory: each step moves from the current i-ac vertex to an adjacent one by making basic the 'other' member of the nonbasic duplicated pair (i.e., the one that does not reverse the path), until complementarity is restored when either x i or y i becomes nonbasic -indicating that another complementary vertex has been reached.
Nondegeneracy assures at each step that a unique basic variable becomes nonbasic, so the path always has a unique continuation until complementarity is restored. Eaves (1971) extends these results to degenerate problems by using a lexicographic order to resolve ties in the selection of the variable leaving the basis when another is introduced.
The Lexicographic Order
Our algorithm also handles degeneracy via a lexicographic order (lex-order) but in a This form specifies directly the dependence on the perturbation , whereas the matrix equation leaves open the specification of the perturbation; in either case, the tableau is a full summary.
To impose a specific lex-order, we select a permutation`of the indices 1; . . . ; 2n of primal and dual variables with the interpretation that the implied perturbation has = 1 ; `( j) = j if 1 j 2n ; where is positive and small. Thus, the permutation`indicates for`(j) n that strategy`(j) is forced into play with a probability of order j ; and for`(j) > n that strategy`(j) 0 n is awarded a bonus of order j .
Each choice of the permutation`defines an associated lex-order as follows. Let M be the permutation matrix that permutes the columns of Z so that the ( (1) ; . . . ;ā i`(2n) must be negative, whereā i 0 b i . When moving from one vertex to another one brings a designated nonbasic column into the basis and makes nonbasic another that is selected to assure that the new vertex is lexpositive. As described in the Appendix, this selection is unique.
For the portion of the algorithm that uses the LH algorithm to follow an i-path we use the lex-order based on the cyclic permutation`i for which
That is,`i = [i + 1; . . . ; 2n; 1; . . . ; i ] is the i-th forward rotation of the identity permutatioǹ [1; . . . ; 2n], and`2 n `. Thus, vertices on an i-path are i-almost complementary, and feasible (lex-positive) with respect to perturbations that perturb z i the least and z i+1 the most. Note that z i is x i if i n and y i0n otherwise, and similarly for z i+1 .
A complementary vertex that is lex-positive using the i-th cyclic permutation is called an i-vertex and denoted (B;`i) if its basis matrix is B.
When discussing an i-vertex we simplify by referring to its associated variable as z i (rather than, say, x i ); but we refer directly to a complementary pair fx j ; y j g rather than complicated references to, say, z j and its complement.
The previously described properties of the LH algorithm are preserved: the effect of a lex-order is implicitly to perturb the problem to make it nondegenerate. In particular, each endpoint of an i-path is an i-vertex covering the corner where only z i+1 is perturbed.
Observe that a set including an i-vertex for each i = 1; . . . ; 2n is simply stable, because each corner is covered. Our algorithm is based on the tactic of switching from an ivertex onto an (i + 1)-path to move to an (i + 1)-vertex. If this is completed successfully for i = 1; . . . ; 2n then the algorithm has computed a simply-stable set.
The Algorithm
We now specify the algorithm and derive its properties. the column of one of the nonbasic duplicated variables were made basic. This nonbasic duplicated variable is said below to be the one that 'interacts' with z i . 14 The NP rule in the Appendix selects for deletion the unique basic column for which the new basic 13 Unlike an i-vertex, an i-ac vertex's covered region need not include any corner: examples are the equilibria in Figure 7 labeled A and C, which cover the corresponding regions in the upper-right panel of Figure 8 . To identify these covered regions it is easiest first to make the basis complementary by replacing one of the basic duplicated pair with one of the nonbasic duplicated pair. For a complementary basis, the inequalities defining the covered region are given by the tableau's rows for basic variables with zero values.
14 If the nonbasic duplicated pair is fx j ; y j g then the member that interacts with x i is x j if i and j are strategies of the same player and y j otherwise; and similarly the member that interacts with y i is y j in this event and x j otherwise. A boundary i-ac vertex has the property that the column of the member of the nonbasic duplicated pair that interacts with z i has a nonpositive element in each row with basic value zero, and a negative element in the row of z i . The Appendix provides details. 28 solution will be lex-positive according to the new lex-order.
Adjacency Relations
For the algorithm we define a symmetric binary relation of adjacency among vertices.
As a preliminary, define a symmetric relation of 'potential adjacency' as follows: If the i-ac vertex is at a boundary, then B y is obtained from B by making basic the member of the nonbasic duplicated pair that interacts with z i , using the NP rule.
Two properties of the potential adjacency relation are established in the following lemmas proved in the Appendix.
Lemma 1: An i-vertex is potentially adjacent to an equilibrium i-ac vertex if and only if it is minimal.
Lemma 2: An i-vertex is potentially adjacent to a boundary (i + 1)-ac vertex if and only if it is maximal.
The implications of these lemmas are depicted schematically in the left panel of Figure 13 . To specify the algorithm we select a particular strategy, hereafter strategy 1, and then relative to this selection we define a relation of 1-adjacency, or just 'adjacency' for 30 brevity, that is the same as potential adjacency except for the restrictions that:
15 Exclude all adjacency relations involving an i-ac vertex for which i > 1 and the basic value of z i is positive (b i > 0).
Exclude all adjacency relations between a 2n-vertex and a 1-vertex or 1-ac vertex.
In keeping with these restrictions, we hereafter specify that a 1-vertex is minimal and an 2n-vertex is maximal. This is consistent with Lemmas 1 and 2 in the following sense. For i > 1 the first restriction confines adjacency to an equilibrium i-ac vertex, which Lemma 1 says can be adjacent to a minimal i-vertex. In parallel, we allow that any 1-ac vertex can be adjacent to a 1-vertex, which is minimal by definition. Similarly, minimality of a 1-vertex and maximality of a 2n-vertex is consistent with the exclusion in the second restriction of adjacencies between a 1-vertex and a 2n-vertex. The second restriction also excludes adjacency between a 2n-vertex and a (boundary) 1-ac vertex. As will be seen, this case never arises in the algorithm because we enforce the rule that a 2n-vertex is a terminus of the algorithm; and in the reverse direction, allowing 1-paths to cross boundaries is the key property that enables the algorithm to move from one component to another in its search for one that is simply stable. In contrast, the first restriction assures that if i 6 = 1 then a boundary i-ac vertex is not adjacent to the one of the two potentially adjacent i-ac vertices that makes basic the interacting member of the nonbasic at a boundary, then it is adjacent to precisely the two i-ac vertices (or one could be an i-vertex) obtained by making basic one of the nonbasic duplicated pair. If i 6 = 1 and it is at a boundary then one of these is replaced by adjacency to the maximal (i 0 1)-vertex obtained by making basic the nonbasic duplicated variable that interacts with z i , using the NP rule.
Q.E.D. The Algorithm
In view of Theorem 1, the algorithm for simply-stable sets consists of starting at one 2n-vertex and thereafter following the unique chain of adjacent vertices to arrive at another 2n-vertex. The locus comprising a chain's vertices and connecting edges is called a route.
We show that a route's terminal 2n-vertex lies in a component that is simply stable if it was entered on a 1-path, and indeed in this case the route's members of this component provide a simply-stable set (not necessarily minimal). In particular, starting from the extraneous vertex's 2n-vertex (I;2 n ), which is uniquely maximal in this component, the route necessarily exits the component from the 1-vertex (I;1), which is uniquely minimal in this component, on a 1-path and terminates in a different component that is simply stable. The members of the route in the last component yield a simply-stable set of equilibria because it enters on a 1-path and terminates at an 2n-vertex, and includes an i-vertex for each i = 1; . . . ; 2n.
The statement of the properties of the algorithm is Pictures such as Figure 15 hide the difficulty in higher dimensions of identifying unstable components. A partial but easy test takes advantage of the fact that a component is stable if any (and therefore all) generic perturbation has an odd number of equilibria near the component; cf. Mertens ( , 1989 . One therefore counts the number of coverings of each corner by the vertices generated by the algorithm. In Figure 15 for instance, the computer program noted (by checking signs of coefficients in the tableau)
that regions E and F are covered twice and A (and C and H) four times, which suggests that an uncovered perturbation can be found. This test is imperfect because in an unstable component like Figure 10 the plain algorithm could generate an odd covering; moreover, the modified algorithm (mentioned above) could find an even covering when in fact the component is stable with an odd covering, as when there is a third plane that covers the perturbations not covered by the first two. In general, an even or odd covering generated by an algorithm is insufficient evidence without assurance that all Modified Game "Do The Right Thing" (1989, 1991 Proof: We show first that an i-vertex that is adjacent to an equilibrium i-ac vertex must be minimal. At an i-vertex there are two possibilities. If the i-th variable z i is nonbasic then it became so via a basis change using the RP rule from the adjacent i-ac vertex where it was basic and zero, and therefore its column has a positive element in the row of a basic zero variable. If z i is basic (and basic-zero at the adjacent i-ac vertex), then it is presently basic-zero, and again its coefficient of 1 in its own row is a positive element in the row of a basic-zero variable. In either case, backward rotation of`i renders the basis infeasible because z i becomes first in the lex-order`i 01 . Conversely, if the i-vertex is minimal then z i is either basic-zero or nonbasic with a positive coefficient in a basiczero row. In either case, making basic the nonbasic member of the i-th complementary pair yields an i-ac vertex with z i 's value being zero. Thus the adjacent i-ac vertex is an equilibrium.
Q.E.D. Negative Pivoting
When moving from an i-ac vertex to an (i01)-vertex or the reverse, one uses the negative pivoting or NP rule to select the column to be deleted from the basis. In this case the pivot is negative. This case happens only for a boundary i-ac vertex and a maximal (i 0 1)-vertex with i > 1. That is, i 6 = 1 and:
(1) The basic value of z i is zero at the i-ac vertex, so the i-ac vertex is an equilibrium. (2) The member of the nonbasic duplicated pair that interacts with z i has a nonpositive element in each row with basic value zero, and a negative element in the row of z i , so the i-ac vertex is at a boundary. variable z i , as described previously. That is, z i 's basic value is zero, its column has a 1 in its row and zeros elsewhere, and the pivot column has a negative element in its row, so the index of z i 's row is in S and it is the only member of S 1 . element in z i+1 's column had its lex-second element positive then the NP rule would select it. Consequently, after the basis change this element will be negative (because the pivot is negative) and after rotating`i forward one step this element will be the lex-first nonzero element in the row of z i+1 . Among other basic-zero rows, any row for which the column of z i+1 has a zero element remains unchanged; in such rows, therefore, the lex-first nonzero element remains unchanged (hence negative) at (B 00 ; i+1 ). As for the remaining basic-zero rows, the NP rule assures that after the basis change the lex-second nonzero element will be negative and after rotation it will be first in the lex-order: this is because the sets S and S 1 are identical and therefore the selection of the pivot row essentially begins with S 2 . Thus, (B 00 ; i+1 ) is (i + 1)-feasible and it is an (i + 1)-ac vertex because the only basic duplicated pair is z i+1 and its complement. It is an equilibrium because the basic value of z i+1 is zero. Finally, it is at a boundary because the newly nonbasic variable is one of the nonbasic duplicated pair, and its column (which is a positive multiple of z i+1 's column at the basis B) has a negative element in the row of z i+1 and nonpositive elements in all other basic-zero rows, as did z i+1 's column previously.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 2: An i-vertex is potentially adjacent to a boundary (i + 1)-ac vertex if and only if
properties of players' preferences.
5. The algorithm is designed purposely not to examine all vertices, since their number can be enormous. The situation is like the difference between the lengths of a circular orbit around the earth, and a flight over every city.
6. The terms 'generic normal-form' in game-theoretic lingo and 'nondegenerate' in linear-programming lingo are essentially equivalent.
7. Their theorem states that the projection from the graph of the equilibrium correspondence to the space of games is homotopic to a homeomorphism. This means that the graph can be stretched to eliminate folds without leaving holes. They use essentially the space of bonuses to model the space of games, so the graph in Figure   3 illustrates their result along a slice in which only the bonus for strategy a varies.
They actually model these spaces as spheres by adding a point at infinity: in Part II we proceed similarly by including an 'extraneous vertex'.
8. The nongeneric perturbations are those in the intersections of covered regions, such as the line between regions A and B, which represent nearby nongeneric games.
Typically, a nongeneric perturbation is associated with a 'vertical' segment of the graph where there is a continuum of equilibria.
9. We use 1 to indicate a vector of ones, 0 to indicate a vector or matrix of zeros, and a prime to indicate 'transpose'.
10. This form is used here for expositional purposes. For computations it is more efficient to treat the players' problems separately so that one works with two m 1 2 m 2 matrices. In fact, it is sufficient to carry out basis changes via pivoting on the two m 2 m submatrices representing the m rows and columns of the players' used strategies. In large games, m is typically small compared to m 1 and m 2 .
11. See also Lemke (1965) and Tomlin (1978) . Nondegeneracy requires that basic variables always have positive values (b 0), which is satisfied by generic normal-form games but not by nontrivial generic extensive games. An extension to degenerate 47 Footnotes two-player games is by Eaves (1971) . For other cases the extensions assume nondegeneracy: two-player games of incomplete information by Howson and Rosenthal (1974) ; N -player polymatrix games by Eaves (1973) and Howson (1972) ; general Nplayer games, by Rosenmüller (1971) and Wilson (1971) ; and Walrasian equilibria of piecewise-linear economies, by Wilson (1978) . The latter three require nonlinear (actually, multilinear) calculations; for games with three or more players it is therefore often more efficient to use approximation methods based on simplicial subdivisions. 14. If the nonbasic duplicated pair is f x j ; y j g then the member that interacts with x i is x j if i and j are strategies of the same player and y j otherwise; and similarly the member that interacts with y i is y j in this event and x j otherwise. A boundary i-ac vertex has the property that the column of the member of the nonbasic duplicated pair that interacts with z i has a nonpositive element in each row with basic value zero, and a negative element in the row of z i . The Appendix provides details.
15. Adjacency obviously depends on both the selected corner (here, only i = 1 allows entry and exit from a component) and the numbering of the strategies via the specification of the cyclic permutations`i. By varying these specifications, the algorithm can find different simply-stable sets.
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Figure Legends 
